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MAR 1 1991
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Roland W. Reichert, Appellant in this Court, submits the following
Supplemental Brief by and through counsel of record pursuant to the
Court's Notice of Supplemental Briefing dated February 5, 1991.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Should Judge Judith M. Billings have recused
herself in the instant case at the Utah Court of
Appeals level? If so, upon what grounds?
FACTS
1.

Bryce Roe, counsel for Respondent Regional Sales, became

formally associated with thefirmof Fabian & Clendenin during the course
of this action at the trial level.
2.

Although counsel for Mr. Reichert did know that this change

in the association of Mr. Roe with Fabian & Clendenin had taken place,
Mr. Fankhauser was unaware of the membership of that firm in detail until
about April 6, 1990.
3.

At or about that time Mr. Fankhauser noted that letterhead

from that firm revealed that said firm had two members named Billings, to
wit Peter W. Billings Sr. and Peter W. Billings, Jr.
4.

The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals had been written

and spearheaded by Judge Judith W. Billings.
5.

Upon further investigation of the relationship, if any, between

the attorneys Billings and Judge Billings, Mr. Fankhauser learned that they
are related within the third degree of affinity.
6.

At oral argument held before this court, Justice Durham

revealed the fact that Judge Billingsregularlydisqualifies herself in
proceedings involving afirmwith which a lawyer-relative is affiliated.

ARGUMENT
I
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution Requires the Presence of a Fair and
Impartial Tribunal as an Element of Due Process.
As a prelude to consideration of the issue presented by the court for
review, Appellant turns the court's attention to the statements of the United
States Supreme Court. That court stated:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.. Fairness of course
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. But our system of law had always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in
his own case and no man is permitted to try cases
where he has an interest in the outcome. That
interest cannot be defined with precision.
Circumstances and relationships must be
considered. This Court has said, however, that
"Every procedure which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge * * * not
to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between
the State and the accused denies the latter due
process of law." [citations omitted] Such a
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges
who have no actual bias and who would do their
very best to weigh the scales of justice equally
between contending parties. But to perform its
high function in the best way "justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice."
In Re Murchison. 75 S.Ct. 623, at 625, emphasis added. This opinion
stresses the fact that considerations regarding disqualification should not be
made only by resort to hard and fast "bright line" rules alone. The very
spirit of due process envisions a fairness that is as important in fact as in

appearance. When considering whether or not the relationship of Judge
Billings to a member of the corporate firm of Fabian & Clendenin requires
disqualification under certain statutes and canons of ethical conduct, this
Court should endeavor to review the appearance of fairness in light of
circumstances and relationships, as well as in view of hard rules and facts.
That is the very spirit of due process and fairness in our system. That
spirit was iterated by this very court:
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual
bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility
of unfairness.
Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 6% P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), at
1221.
II
Judge Billings is charged with responsibility for
knowing the facts upon which disqualification is
appropriate.
In Respondent's reply to the contentions of Appellant that Judge
Billings should have disqualified herself dated April 13,1990, Respondent
attempts to lay responsibility upon Mr. Reichert for knowing the
relationship between Judge Billings and the firm of Fabian & Clendenin.
However, the only persons who can reasonably be charged with knowledge
of those relationships which give rise to the issue of disqualification are
Judge Billings and Mr. Bryce Roe. Nevertheless, Respondent seeks to
divert the attention of the court from this fact. For example, Respondent at
page two of the April 13, 1990 brief states "a fact of which this court may
take notice is that Peter Billings has been associated with Fabian &
Clendenin for 40 years", as if such fact should be obvious to practicing
attorneys, or that the fact of relationship by name recognition alone should

be obvious to other attorneys. Furthermore, Respondent argues that the
issue of disqualification is not timely, inferring that Appellant should have
known about the relationship between Judge Billings and members of
Respondent's firm at some earlier time, laying charge of such knowledge
upon Appellant. Respondent goes so far as to make a Rule 11 type of
argument, referring to the parties obligation to make reasonable inquiry
into facts providing a basis for a cause of action, stating with characteristic
presumptuousness that "any reasonable inquiry would have informed
[Appellant's] counsel of the relationship of Judge Billings to employees of
Fabian & Clendenin." (April 13,1990 Brief at pages 5-6) With respect,
the learned Mr. Roe forgets that at the commencement of this action he was
not associated with Fabian & Clendenin and that a reasonable inquiry could
not have led to knowledge of the facts supporting disqualification, that this
is Respondent's case and cause of action (as Plaintiff below), and that this
Rule 11 type of argument has no applicability to the facts at hand. These
attempts at placing the blame on Mr. Reichert for not having sought
disqualification of Judge Billings are not consonant with Utah statute and
canons of judicial conduct.
In making a determination as to whether or not disqualification of a
judge is appropriate, the judge must "consider not only the specific
provisions of the statutes ... but also the Code of Judicial Conduct." Smith
v. Beckman. 683 P.2d 1214 (Colo.App. 1984), at 1216; see also Stephens
v. Stephens. 292 S.E.2d 689 (1982). Appellant intends to follow this
procedure in analyzing the issue of disqualification of Judge Billings as
framed by this Court.
Utah statute and the Code of Judicial Conduct (as adopted in Utah)
combine to make clear the fact that a Judge, and not the parties, must know

those facts which require disqualification due to familial relationships
arising from consanguinity or affinity. Section 78-7-l(b), Utah Code
Annotated, requires that a judge disqualify himself or herself when he or
she is "related to either party by consanguinity or affinity 1 within the third
degree, computed according to the rules of common law", (emphasis
added) Canon 3(C)(1)(d), et seq., Code of Judicial Conduct, requires even
more factual knowledge of the Judge's potential relationship to a particular
judicial proceeding, referring to whether or not "the judge or spouse, or a
person within the third degree of relationship to either or them, of the
spouse of such a person", (emphasis added) The statutory provisions cited
require a judge to refrain from participation in a case based upon
consanguinity or affinity to parties, attorneys, e t c . , within the third
degree of relationship. The canons of judicial conduct go further, to
include the spouses of such related persons.2 Since the surnames of such
persons could vary greatly from that of the judge in question, it would be
folly to require a party or its counsel to keep an updated and complete list
of the judge's disqualifying relatives. The person best suited to know the
nature and extent of such relationships is, of course, the judge.
Finally, canon 3(D) makes clear the fact that disclosure of facts
which may give rise to disqualification due to familial relationship rests
with the judge. That section of the canons of judicial conduct provides:

^Consanguinity refers to the judge's blood relatives, while affinity usually refers to those persons related to
the judge's spouse by blood. There are, however, three separate categories of affinity according to Black's
Law Dictionary: Direct, secondary and collateral. (Blacks 6th edition, 1990, at 59) Direct affinity refers to
the husbands relationship to die wife'srelationsby blood, and vice versa. Secondary affinity subsists
between the husband and his wife's relations by marriage, and vice versa. Collateral affinity subsists
between die husband and the relations of his wife's relations, and vice versa. The canons and the statute
cited are not clear as to which categories of affinity are intended.
2
This may lead one to believe that the canons of judicial conduct specify some mixture of direct and
secondary affinity.

c

A judge may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the record or in writing
the basis of the disqualification.
The judge has a clear ethical responsibility to disclose potential
relationships which may require disqualification. Therefore, the Judge
(not the parties or their counsel) is ethically and statutorily charged with
knowledge of the facts of relationship with may require disqualification.
The arguments and contentions of Respondent to the effect that Mr.
Reichert or his counsel should have known of the disqualifying relationship
are not founded in law, and cannot be reasonably required in fact.
Ill
Under What Circumstances Should a Judge
Withdraw due to relationship?
In accordance with the terms of Canons 1,2 and 3, Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned must
enter a disqualification. Canon 1 emphasizes the independence of the
judiciary as indispensable to justice in our society. Ours is an adversarial
system, not one of inquisitorial procedure in which the judge takes on the
role of advocate, and trier of fact and law. In our system, the impartiality
of a judge is assisted by a certain degree of independence from apparent
bias and prejudice. Canon 2(B) provides that a judge should not allow
family relationships to influence judicial conduct of judgment. This canon
has the subtitle "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All Activities". The "appearance" of impropriety may arise
from family relationships in the context of judicial activity, which this
canon seeks to avoid. This very issue was addressed by the Colorado Court
of Appeals in Smith, supra. Not only must a judge maintain respect in the
conduct of court, they must "enhance the respect of the judiciary in the

eyes of the public." Smith at 1216. Again placing the responsibility for
securing the respect of the public in the court system upon judges, and not
upon the parties, the court in Smith states:
It is of paramount importance that our judges
meticulously avoid any appearance of partiality,
not only to secure the confidence of litigants
before the courts, but to retain public respect.
Smith at 1216, emphasis added. Canons 1,2 and 3(C) should be read
together in order to define the "appearance of impropriety" for purposes
of disqualification.
Most pertinent to our discussion is Canon 3(C), quoted in part above.
Canon 3(C) begins with a statement of a general rule regarding mandatory
disqualification:
(C) Disqualification.
(1) Disqualification must be entered in a
proceeding by any judge whose impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,...
This is the statement of the general rule of ethical disqualification. It
provides for disqualification in circumstances where impartiality might be
reasonably questioned due to the nature of the proceedings, the subject
matter involved, or the persons or entities involved, whether directly or
indirectly, especially those who have any interest in the proceedings, to
include financial interests. Without limiting the scope of the general rule,
this canon goes on to provide specific examples of circumstances under
which disqualification is mandatory since reasonable persons would
conclude that impartiality can be questioned:
(C) Disqualification.
(1) Disqualification must be entered in a
proceeding by any judge whose impartiality might

reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
***

(d) The judge or spouse, or a person within
the third degree of relationship to either of them,
or the spouse of such a person:
***

(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an
interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
Both of the circumstances iterated in subsections (ii) and (iii) are present in
the case at bar.
As Respondent was careful to disclose in its brief of April 13,1990,
Fabian & Clendenin is a Professional Corporation. Fabian & Clendenin
clearly acts as lawyer in these proceedings. To confirm this fact, one need
only read the cover page of that brief, stating "Bryce E. Roe, Esq. ...
FABIAN & CLENDENIN... Attorneys for Respondent". Furthermore, the
Smith case states clearly that a partner in a firm is engaged or is acting in a
case for the purposes of Canon 3 primarily because he has a financial
interest in the outcome of the case. Since Fabian & Clendenin is a
corporation, Mr. Roe was acting in the course of representing Regional
Sales, probably as an agent, shareholder, director or officer or the
corporation of Fabian & Clendenin. That corporation, as attorney
representing Regional Sales, had member persons who were related within
the third degree of affinity to Judge Billings, namely Peter W. Billings, Sr.
and Peter W. Billings, Jr., who are no doubt agents, shareholders, officers
or directors of that corporation. Therefore, the whole corporate firm falls
under the requirements of mandatory disqualification, as a related attorney
in an offending degree of relationship to Judge Billings. Of course, all

facts underlying the exact relationship between Peter W. Billings Sr and
Peter W. Billings Jr. is in the control of Fabian & Clendenin. Appellant is
at a decided disadvantage in proving thisrelationshipand can only make
relevant allegations at this point.
The issue of awarding attorney's fees to Fabian & Clendenin requires
disqualification under subsection (iii), since it has an interest^ in the
outcome of the proceedings. In the case of Sadbury v. Wilson. 441 P.2d
381 (Okla., 1968), the court held that a judge should have disqualified
himself where he would have been called upon to decide the issue of
attorney's fees following the termination of another stage of litigation. The
verdict reached at trial was upheld by the Court of Appeals in an opinion
authored by Judge Billings, in which Regional Sales prevailed upon the
merits and the terms of the contract(s) in question. This entitled the firm
to receipt of attorney's fees under that contract, a direct interest in the
outcome of the litigation. Other additional interests include the prestige of
the firm for having won the case, and the potential for additional work and
revenue from Regional Sales or persons whom it refers to Fabian &
Clendenin based upon the successful outcome of the case. Fabian &
Clendenin has a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of this case,
and therefore, Judge Billings should have disqualified herself from the
proceedings, or should have disclosed the facts underlying disqualification
to the parties, and allowed the parties to waive disqualification if they so
desired pursuant to canon 3(D).

3

Note that the canon does not state a 'substantial" interest, or a "pecuniary" interest. Furthermore, the
Canon does have sections which clearly state "financial interest", and that term is defined within the canon.

IV
Judge Billing's Past History of Voluntary
Disqualification in cases in which a lawyerrelative is affiliated Underscores her Appreciation
of Avoiding even the Appearance of Partiality.
Judge Billings has a history of disqualifying herself from
proceedings involving a law firm with which a lawyer-relative is affiliated.
She, of all people, can best appreciate her own ability to deal impartially
with cases involving Fabian & Clendenin. Appellant can offer no
explanation for why she did not disqualify herself in this case. Appellant
does not allege that the failure to disqualify was intentional or malicious.
Nevertheless, presumably knowing the ethical requirements contained in
statute and canons of conduct, she has repeatedly disqualified herself. Her
subjective understanding of the potential for partiality (or the appearance
of it) involving representation by Fabian & Clendenin far surpasses the
requirements of any objective standard established in the Code of Judicial
Conduct. She is the best judge of her own limitations and of her own
ethical conduct, and has historically elected to take the wise course of
disqualification in such cases. This court should take her own past conduct
as the measure of relief prayed for by Appellant. In answering the issue as
framed by the court, Appellant concludes that Judge Billings should have
disqualified herself, or should have made the facts of disqualification
known to the parties, allowing the the parties to waive it if they so elected.
In the event that the parties did not elect to waive disqualification, then it
became mandatory.

11

CONCLUSION
The relationship of Judge Billings to members of the Firm of Fabian
& Clendenin required her disqualification as a judge hearing the appeal at
bar. Judge Billings is charged with knowing the familial relationships
which could trigger disqualification under the Utah Code section quoted
above, and the canons of judicial conduct cited. Having heard the case, and
having ruled directly against Appellant Mr. Reichert on virtually every
point in his favor, and having ruled positively on those points raised on
appeal that were favorable to Regional Sales, the "appearance" of
impropriety on her part is indeed very real. Due to her past history of
disqualification, it would appear that Judge Billings is aware of her ethical
and statutory duties in this regard. Her relationship to Peter W. Billings,
Sr., and Peter W. Billings, Jr., who are apparently officers, shareholders
directors of agents of the firm of Fabian & Clendenin and who are within
the third degree of affinity, requires disqualification since that corporate
firm has an interest in the outcome of the litigation as do the persons to
whom she is related. The failure of Judge Billings to disqualify herself
from the case renders the opinion of the Court of Appeals void, not merely
voidable. (See Hoff v. Eighth Judicial District Court. 378 P.2d 977
(Nevada 1963)) This Court should therefore hold that the opinion of the
Court of Appeals is void, and grant the relief prayed for by Appellant in its
brief (i.e., leave the verdict and award of attorney's fees undisturbed; or
reverse if in fact there was prejudicial error and remand to the trial court

allowing Appellant his day in court on equal footing with Respondent).
Respectfully submitted this_Z_ day of

yy\ (%AA&I . 1991.

IRAIMRFANKHAUSER
DAVID D. PECK
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
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1991,1 served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Supplemental Brief on
Respondent by mailing the same first class postage prepaid to:

BRYCE E. ROE
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Attorneys for Respondent
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